The objective of self-healing key distribution is to enable group users to recover session keys by themselves, without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager (GM), even when they miss some broadcast messages. One major benefit of the self-healing key distribution mechanism is the reduction of energy consumption due to the elimination of such additional transmission. Also in some applications, e.g., uni-directional broadcast channel from the GM, the self-healing key distribution mechanism seems to be the ideal solution. Desired features of self-healing key distribution schemes include energy awareness, short broadcast message, efficient users addition, revocation and so on. A primary challenge is managing the trade-off between providing an acceptable level of security and conserving scarce resources in particular energy which is critical for wireless network operations. Over a decade, a great number of self-healing key distribution schemes have been proposed for establishing a group key amongst a dynamic group of users over an unreliable, or lossy, network. In this paper a comprehensive survey is conducted on the state-of-the-art in the field of self-healing key distribution. First, we clarify the security requirements of self-healing key distribution scheme for their special application environment. Then, we present a classification of self-healing key distribution schemes according to different cryptographic primitives, and give an insight to their features and goals. Furthermore, we consider several problems, namely authentication on broadcast messages, sponsorization and mutual-healing, related to the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes. At last, we delineate their similarities and differences and outline several future research directions.
INTRODUCTION
Group communication can enjoy the benefit of communication efficiency from broadcast in distributing secret digital content. However, there is a challenge of effectively controlling access to the transmitted data. The broadcast by itself does not provide any mechanisms for preventing non-group members from the group communication. One common method for enabling secure broadcast communication is distributing a session key to group users and updating it on each operation of adding or revoking users. All messages broadcasted within the group during a certain sessions are communicated securely through encryption under the session key. Although the sensitivity of the broadcasted messages makes session keys essential to secure group communication, distributing session keys become an issue, especially distributing session keys for large dynamic communication groups. Researchers have proposed many different key distribution schemes. These schemes can be divided into two main classes according to the underlying networks. One is key distribution over reliable networks and the other is key distribution over unreliable networks. The problem of distributing keys over a reliable channel has received much attention [1] [2] [3] [4] . The research on self-healing key distribution for establishing keys over an unreliable network began in 2002. Since then, self-healing key distribution, as one of the techniques for wireless security, has been one of the hot research topics.
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The target of key distribution is to establish and maintain secure channels between the group manager (GM) and multiple group users. Session keys need to be updated as long as membership changes in order to maintain security and resilience to attacks [5] . The updated session key prevents a new user from decoding messages broadcasted before it joins the group and a revoked user from accessing the group communication after it leaves the group. However, distributing the session keys to authorized users is a complex problem. Although rekeying a group before the join of a new user is trivial (send the new group key to the old group users encrypted with the old group key), rekeying the group after a user leaves is far more complicated. The old key cannot be used to distribute a new one, because the leaving user knows the old key. Therefore, the GM must provide another scalable mechanism to update the session keys.
A naive scheme for key updating within a group with n users is to have the GM assign a pair-wise key shared between the group manger and the intended user during the phase of initiation. In order to update a session key, the GM encrypts it with the pairwise keys shared between them and then unicasts the encrypted messages. On receiving the messages, the intended user can recover the session key using the shared key. In fact, this method is not simple or scalable. In each round of key updating, the group manager has to encrypt the group key and unicast the encrypted key n times. Therefore, both the computation and communication overhead brought by this operation are O(n). Even though the operation is simple, the overheads of the scheme in large dynamic groups are too high to afford.
Mobile wireless networks are often highly volatile [5, 6] . Wireless nodes may move in and out of range frequently, and there is usually no infrastructure support to guarantee reliable delivery of messages. Thus, a message sent to a group may or may not reach all the group users. The problem of packet loss should be highlighted in an unreliable network. The key distribution broadcast for a particular session might never reach all users. Individual interactions, such as requesting and retransmission, in large group will induce more communication overhead and place a heavy burden on the GM. In addition, users may reveal their current location by sending messages in some high-security environments. Particularly, many digital content and multi-media distribution systems are based on a uni-directional broadcast distribution channel, such as satellite or cable [7] . It is impossible to request or re-transmit under these communication channel. The main property of self-healing key distribution is that, even if at the beginning of certain sessions some broadcast packets get lost, group users are still capable of recovering the session key for those sessions simply by using the broadcasts they have received at a previous session and the packets they will receive at a subsequent one. This noninteractive key distribution scheme reduces the network traffic, decreases the work load on the GM and lowers the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis. Therefore, self-healing key distribution schemes are desirable for both efficiency and security reasons.
Application
This survey is motivated by an investigation of the security in several settings in which session keys need to be used for a short time-period or need to be updated frequently, due to frequent changes in the membership. Self-healing is a good property for key distribution in wireless sensor networks, where the nodes/devices are powered by batteries and have the unique feature of moving in and out of range frequently. Also there might be situations where some users are not constantly online or experience burst packet losses. It can rejoin the group once the power is on again. All these considerations can take great advantage from self-healing key distribution schemes with revocation capability. Military-oriented applications as well as rescue missions and scientific explorations, where the adversary may intercept, modify and/or partially interrupt the communication, are few important examples which can benefit from self-healing key distribution schemes. Selfhealing key distribution schemes have also found applications in broadcast communication, pay-per-view TV, information service delivering sensitive content/information to authorized recipients over low-cost and uni-directional communication channel.
Contribution
The objective of this paper is to highlight the features and performance/security attributes of self-healing key distribution schemes. We describe the procedures of self-healing key distribution and present a classification of existing selfhealing key distribution schemes according to the different cryptographic primitives that they are based on. The classification enables identification of common architectural elements and features, and to expose common vulnerabilities of each class of the existing schemes. In order to delineate their similarities and differences, we make a thorough comparison of their security and performance. Subsequently, we discuss three considerations to strengthen the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes. Finally, we outline some problems to be solved and several future research directions. We expect that our survey provides a guideline and certain criteria to fairly evaluate the performance of self-healing key distribution schemes.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce the desirable features of self-healing key distribution schemes. In Section 3, we classify the self-healing key distribution schemes from different aspects. In Section 4, we present the classic model and general procedures of selfhealing key distribution schemes. In Section 5, we give an overview of existing works in the area of self-healing key distribution according to their classification. Then, in Section 6, we discuss three aspects, namely authentication on broadcast messages, sponsorization and mutual-healing, which can be Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes for Wireless Networks 551 used to strengthen the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes. A compositive analysis of the existing schemes was proposed in Section 7. We outline the problems to be solved and future works in this field in Section 7. At last, conclusions are provided in Section 8.
DESIRABLE FEATURES OF SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Self-healing key distribution can be considered as a branch of key distribution. Key distribution schemes should meet availability, integrity, confidentiality, authentication and nonreputation traditional security requirements. The same is true of self-healing key distribution schemes. In addition, according to the feature and application environment of self-healing key distribution, some particular evaluation measurements should be highlighted. The first one is security. The security here includes not only forward and backward secrecy but also collusion resistance between the newly joined nodes and the revoked nodes. Considering the wireless application environment, storage and bandwidth are regarded as constrained resources as well as computational power. Therefore, storage, communication and computation overheads should be as low as possible. Furthermore, the group may become too large to be managed by a single party, thus raising the issue of scalability. A self-healing key distribution scheme used in a resource-limited environment seeks to minimize the workloads of both GM and end users in order to augment the scalability. To sum up, the performance of selfhealing key distribution scheme can be evaluated by:
(i) Forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy is used to prevent a revoked user from continued accessing the session key even if it keeps receiving the broadcast messages. Backward secrecy is used to prevent a new user from decoding messages broadcasted before it joins the group. When a group requires forward and backward secrecy, the session key must be changed for every membership change [8] . (ii) Collusion resistance. The collaboration of the newly joined users and the revoked users must not be able to recover the session keys which they are not entitled to. This is a stronger and practical security requirement. (iii) Efficiency. The condition of limited storage, communication and computation ability must be given full consideration. In self-healing key distribution schemes, storage overhead refers to the number of private keys that group users store in their memory; computation overhead means the necessary computation load to generate session key by the GM and the necessary computation cost to recover session key by end users; and communication overhead is measured by the size of messages delivered by the GM in the process of distributing session keys. (iv) Scalability. Self-healing key distribution operations should be finished in a timely manner despite a varying [10]- [11] , [12] [ 13], [14] , [15] Vector space secret sharing [16] , [17] [ 18], [19] , [20] Hash chain None [21] - [19] , [15, 20] number of users and node densities. The fraction of the available bandwidth occupied by network management traffic should be kept as low as possible. Any increase in management traffic will reduce the available bandwidth for payload data accordingly. Hence, scalability of selfhealing key distribution schemes is crucial.
CLASSIFICATION OF SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
The success of a self-healing key distribution scheme is determined in part by its ability to securely and efficiently recover session key in low-cost wireless networks. Selfhealing key distribution schemes can be broadly classified into unconditionally secure and computationally secure schemes. Unconditionally, secure schemes based on information theory, which is generally considered to have been founded in 1948 by Claude Shannon in his seminal work [9] and are defined by entropy function H (·). While computationally secure schemes are based on one or several open hard problems. The first and several subsequent self-healing key distribution schemes are unconditionally secure. More and more research works are computationally secured in recent years. The existing selfhealing key distribution schemes can be classified into more classes with regard to different cryptographic primitives that they based on. They are polynomial secret sharing, vector space secret sharing, hash chain, subset difference rekeying (SDR) and bilinear pairings based self-healing key distribution schemes. Table 1 shows a classification based on the two criteria: unconditionally secure vs. computationally secure and different cryptographic primitives they based on.
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be the finite universe of users. Each user U i has a unique identifier I D i . A broadcast unreliable channel is available, and time is defined by a global clock. The GM sets up and manages, by means of joining and revoking operations, a communication group which is a dynamic subset of U . All the operations take place in a fixed range (here we suppose the range is F p , where p is a sufficiently large prime number). Let G j ⊆ U be the communication group established by the GM in session j (j = 1, . . . , m). Each user U i ∈ G j holds a personal key S i , received from the GM before or when joining G j . The personal key is used to recover the session keys as long as U i is not removed by the GM from the group. Figure 1 depicts a general communication model.
Let R j ⊆ G j −1 denote the set of revoked group users in session j and J j ⊂ U \ G j −1 denotes the set of users who join the group in session j with R j ∩ J j = φ. Hence,
Moreover, for session j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the session key K j is chosen independently and according to the uniform distribution on F p . For any non-revoked user U i ∈ G j , the j -th session key K j is determined by broadcast information B j and personal key S i . All the aforementioned notions are used throughout the paper.
The general model of self-healing key distribution scheme
Self-healing key distribution schemes are defined under security models. The pioneering self-healing key distribution scheme [10] is unconditionally secure and defined by entropy function H (·) (see [25] for more details). The subsequent models are slightly modified versions of the basic one.
To clarify the performance of the schemes and facilitate the later analysis, we mention the following formal security model of the self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation capability. Here we consider the original communication model.
Suppose there are n users and a GM. The life-time of the network is divided into m sessions. t is the maximum number of users that can be revoked in the life-time of the network. We define the general self-healing key distribution scheme from two aspects. Definition 1 defines self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation capability. Definition 2 defines the properties of security including forward secrecy, backward secrecy and the capability of collusion resistance. 
(ii) 
where S R denotes the set of personal keys of all users in R. 
In Definition 1, Condition (i) states that every user U i , from the broadcast B j and its own personal key S i , recovers the current session key K j ; while, personal keys and broadcasts alone, do not give any information about any session key. Condition (ii) means the GM is able to revoke at most t users from the group. Condition (iii) characterizes the selfhealing property: any two broadcasts are enough to recover all lost session keys for the 'sandwich' sessions. In Definition 2, Conditions (i) and (ii) describe the forward secrecy and backward secrecy, respectively. Condition (iii) defines the feature of resisting collusion. It states that a coalition of or less t revoked users and the newly joined users cannot obtain any information about the current session key.
A lower bound on personal keys
Here we emphasize a lower bound on personal keys, which can be neglected easily, for unconditionally self-healing key distribution scheme. Fig. 2 , The large pane 1 includes the operations performed by the GM, while the large pane 2 includes all the operations performed by the end users.
Setup
The GM chooses and releases system parameters. It also generates and privately distributes personal keys to current group users. It is supposed that the personal keys are distributed in a off-line manner or there is a secure channel between the group manager and each user in this procedure. At last, the GM chooses m session keys K 1 , · · · , K m from a fixed key space (for example F p ). These session keys are independent to each other and according to uniform distribution.
Broadcast
Let |G j | denote the number of users in session j . For each session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the session group G j , the GM computes and broadcasts message B j so that only authorized users can recover the session key from the broadcast message and their personal keys. At the same time, the construction of broadcast message should meet the properties of forward and backward secrecy as well as the property of collusion resistance.
Key recovery
When an authorized user U i ∈ G j receives the broadcast message B j , it can recover the session key for the j th session using its personal key and the received broadcast message.
Adding or revoking users
When the GM wants to add a new user from session j , it will generate and privately distribute personal key to the new user so that the new user can recover session keys in subsequent sessions. Similarly, if the GM wants to revoke a user from session j , it will add or delete some information related to the revoked user in the procedure of Broadcast so that the revoked user cannot recover the session keys in subsequent sessions. Both forward and backward secrecy as well as the property of collusion resistance should be guaranteed in this procedure.
Self-healing
If a user misses some broadcast messages before session j , when it receives the broadcast message in session j , it can recover all the lost session keys using its personal key and the broadcast B j . The only requirement that must be satisfied, in order for the user to recover the lost keys, is the membership in the group both before and after the sessions in which the broadcast messages containing the keys are sent. Among these procedures, Setup only happens at the period of initialization. Broadcast and Key Recovery are performed in each session. While Adding or Revoking Users is not necessarily happen in each session. Self-healing is triggered by the loss of broadcast messages. It happens only in the sessions before which the broadcast messages get lost.
TYPICAL SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this section, we present an overview of existing works in the area of self-healing key distribution according to their classification. Here we omit the proof of security of each scheme because the security of each scheme was proved in the corresponding referenced paper. Nevertheless, we make a thorough analysis and comparison on performance of schemes in the same classification.
Polynomial secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes
The idea of self-healing key distribution scheme was introduced by Staddon et al. in the pioneering work [10] . Formal definitions, lower bounds on the resources as well as some constructions of self-healing key distribution scheme were proposed in it. The GM, at the beginning of each session, sends packets over an unreliable broadcast channel in order to provide a key to each user of the group. Combined with the pre-distributed secret key, every authorized user can recover the session key from the packets. By this way, the GM can launch multiple sessions during a certain time interval, by adding/removing users to/from the initial group. The selfhealing feature in key distribution scheme enables a GM to distribute session key for a dynamic group over an unreliable network. If, at the beginning of a certain session, some broadcasted packets get lost, then users are still capable of recovering the session key for that session simply by using the packets they have received at the beginning of one of a previous session and the packets they will receive at the beginning of a subsequent one, without requesting additional transmission from the GM. The only requirement that a user must satisfy in order to recover the lost keys through self-healing is its membership in the group both before and after the sessions in which the broadcast messages containing the keys are sent. Such approach reduces network traffic and the work load on the GM as well as the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis. Since then, self-healing key distribution has been one of hot research topics. This scheme explored the way to extend the lifetime of the basic self-healing key distribution scheme. After a set of m session has expired, the operation of rekeying is necessary before distributing new session keys due to the changed membership and released personal keys of the revoked users. A straightforward method is to redistribute a new set of personal keys to each user, and proceeds as before. Another method is to do polynomial interpolation in the exponent. This is accomplished through the broadcast of random values from the GM. This operation allows each user to evolve their personal keys from one set of m sessions to the next, thus making the scheme long-lived without any unicasts from the GM. The second method in significant bandwidth saving over the first one. who is revoked in session j 1 , rejoins the group in a later session j 2 , can recover the key for session j 1 . Therefore, the scheme is prone to a rejoin-collusion attack and does not allow temporary revocation.
More et al. [11] addressed the three problems discussed in [10] using a sliding window mechanism. The three problems are inconsistent robustness, high overhead and expensive maintenance cost. The scheme achieved good performance. Above all, the usage of a sliding window mechanism makes error recovery consistently robust. In addition, the GM is entitled to spread the cost of personal key distribution over multiple sessions, rather than having to distribute new personal keys to all users at the same time. Furthermore, reusing masking polynomial reduces personal key storage and broadcast size dramatically.
Blundo et al. [28] proposed a new mechanism for implementing self-healing key distribution. Moreover, they described a secure and efficient construction which has optimal memory storage and communication complexity. Shortly after that, they in [26] presented an attack on the first construction discussed in [10] . Then, they proposed a new self-healing key distribution scheme, which requires low storage and communication overhead. Finally, they slightly modified the security model, in order to extend the self-healing key distribution model, and proposed a scheme which enables a user to recover from a single broadcast message all keys associated with sessions in which it is a user of the communication group. They pointed out two problems of the long-lived 'Construction 5' in [10] . In [10] , the values that are used for computing the instances of the personal key are sent by means of a single broadcast message at the beginning of each new set of m sessions. Since the network is not reliable, if some user does not receive such a message, She will get out from the corresponding m sessions. This problem is solved by sending with each broadcast the values that are used for evolving the personal key in each session. For the solution of the first problem, the involved cost of modular exponentiation operations is too high to afford for low-cost wireless networks. This solution is turned out to be infeasible. The second problem lies in the join operation in the presence of new users. It cannot be solved by slight modifying 'Construction 5' given in [10] and 'Scheme 4' given in [26] in order to enable a secure join. It is still an open problem.
Hong et al. proposed a new self-healing key distribution scheme in [29] . It is one of efficient unconditionally secure selfhealing key distribution scheme. As the original self-healing key distribution scheme, it includes five procedures:
and m session keys K 1 , . . . , K m ∈ F p . Both polynomials and session keys are independent on each other and according to uniform distribution. Then, the GM privately sends personal key 
where
(iii) Key Recovery: When a user U i ∈ G j receives the j -th broadcast message, it evaluates the polynomial r j (x) at point i, and computes current session key by computing
(iv) Adding or Revoking Users: When the GM wants to add a new user starting from the r-th session, it gives a unused unique identity i ∈ F p , computes personal keys corresponding to the current and future sessions {s k (i )}(k = r, . . . , m) and privately sends the keys to this new user. When the GM wants to revoke a user U i starting from session s, it adds the identity i ∈ F p to W j for j = s, . . . , m. (v) Self-healing: For any U i that is a user in session r and
By the method described in Key Recovery, U i can subsequently recover the whole sequence of session keys K r , . . . , K s .
Compared with previous schemes, this scheme has good combined performance. It is optimal in terms of user memory storage and more efficient in terms of communication complexity.
The papers [10, 11] focus on unconditionally secure selfhealing key distribution. The definitions and constructions were stated in terms of the entropy function. Blundo et al. [30] analyzed current definitions of self-healing key distribution. They showed that no protocol can achieve the security requirements stated in [10] and [27] proposed schemes fail. They also showed that a previously derived lower bound on the size of the broadcast messages that the GM has to send in order to establish session keys, proved in [10] and also used in [27] , does not hold. After analysis, they proposed a new definition of self-healing key distribution and showed that it can be achieved by concrete schemes. Some lower bounds on the resources, such as user memory storage and communication complexity, required for implementing such schemes were given finally and showed that these lower bounds are tight through simple constructions.
Dutta claimed that they realized unconditionally secure selfhealing key distribution schemes in [31] and [32] . The storage overhead in these two papers is (t + 1) log p, where t is the maximum number of compromised users and p is the key space. However, this claim cannot hold. Indeed, in [10] , [16] and [26] , it has been proved that a lower bound on the size of the storage overhead is equal to (m − j + 1) log p, where m is the life-time of the network, j is order of the current session and logp is the size of the distributed key. According to the above-mentioned bound, one cannot design an unconditional secure self-healing scheme for m sessions by giving to each user a (t +1) log p-size secret key which is updated by a broadcast message. The papers [10] , [16] and [26] are referenced by both [31] and [32] , but it seems that the authors missed this lower bound.
Zou and Dai [33] proposed a new self-healing scheme based on a novel concept of access polynomial. It overcomes some shortcomings of the existing schemes yet still possesses all the advantages of them. We should point that the communication overhead in [33] comes from broadcast B j which is composed by 2m + 2 polynomials. As far as the polynomial P j (x) is concerned, P j (x) = A j (x)·S j (x)+H (x). Both S j (x) and H (x) are t degree polynomials, and the degree of A j (x) amounts to (|G j | + 1) where |G j | is the number of users in current communication group. Generally speaking, |G j | is larger than t. Therefore, the claim that communication overhead is O(mt) is incorrect.
Tian et al. introduced and improved a secret-sharing scheme in [13] . Then, they applied the secret-sharing scheme to the design of a self-healing key scheme. The new scheme achieves several nice properties. First, the scheme reduces the storage overhead of personal key to a constant. Secondly, the scheme cancels the requirement of secure channel in setup phase. In addition, the long-lived scheme is much more efficient than those in [10] and [26] . However, the efficiency improvements are obtained by relaxing the security slightly. The scheme is a computationally secure scheme. By introducing a one-way key chain, Dutta et al. proposed two constructions of scalable self-healing key distribution with t revocation capability in [14] . The schemes reduce both communication and computation overheads greatly without increasing the storage overhead. At the same time, forward and backward secrecy are achieved. However, there is a fatal defect in their constructions. The collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users can recover all the session keys which they were not authorized to.
In terms of storage overhead, the schemes require that each user stores a personal key for each session. It comes from the procedure of Setup and after receiving the session key distribution broadcast. Communication overhead comes from the procedure of Broadcast. Generally speaking, the broadcast message for the j -th session consists of identifiers of a set of revoked users. Since the user identities can be selected from a small finite field , one can ignore the communication overhead brought by the identifies of all the revoked users set [29] . Computation overhead is introduced by the procedures of Key Recovery and Self-healing. It is supposed that the GM has more resource to operate computation while end users have limited computational ability. Therefore, we talk only about the computation cost at users' end. For different cryptographic primitives the schemes based on, the computation overhead varies.
To clarify the performance of the proposed schemes, we present a thorough comparison of them. Table 2 summarizes the comparison in terms of storage, communication, computation overheads and several security parameters. We use C to denote Construction and S to denote Scheme, for example, C3 in [10] [27] 2(m − j + 1) log p [(m − j + 1)t + (m + 1)] log p mt+ t + 2tj + j Both, t-wise At most t Yes S2 in [26] (m − j + 1) log p (2tj + j) log p 2j (t 2 + t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes C1 in [29] (m − j + 1) log p (tj+ j − t − 1) log p j ( 2t + 1) Both, t-wise At most t Yes [28] (m − j + 1) log p (t+ 1)tj log p j ( 2t 2 + 3t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes [13] logp (t + 1)j log p j ( log p + 2t 2 + 2t) Both, t-wise At most t No C1 in [14] (m − j + 1) log p (t+ 1) log p 2t + 1 Both, t-wise No Yes C2 in [14] (m − j + 1) log p (t+ 1) log p 2(t 2 + t) Both, t-wise No Yes denote the 'Construction 3' in [10] . We suppose the life-span of schemes is m sessions. j represents the order of a session, t represents the maximum number of users that can be revoked and logp represents the length of private and session keys. The storage overhead is measured by the length of personal key. The communication overhead comes from broadcast messages. For a user U i at the j -th session, the computation overhead is incurred by recovering all previous session keys up to the j -session (worst case) by self-healing mechanism [14] . The key recovery operations include computing one or more points on polynomials (such as operations in [27, 29] ) or recovering a t degree polynomial by using Lagrange formulation (such as operations in [13, 14, 26, 28] ) or both (such as operations in [10] ). Computing a point on a t degree polynomial requires at most t multiplication operations and division can be regarded as multiplication when we calculate computation overhead. Compared with the overhead brought by multiplication, the overhead brought by addition and hash operations can be neglected. Therefore, the computation cost for each user is 2t +1 of 'Construction 1'in [14] , whereas the computation complexity of the scheme of 'Construction 1' in [29] is j (2t + 1). Recovery of a t degree polynomial by using Lagrange formulation requires 2{(t +1) 2 −(t +1)} = 2(t 2 +t) multiplication operations. Thus the computation overhead of 'Scheme 2' in [26] is 2j ((t 2 + t)) and that of 'Construction 2' in [14] is 2((t 2 + t)). t-wise for forward and backward secrecy means these schemes can keep forward and backward secrecy for the coalition of at most t unauthorized users. The capability of resisting collusion means the scheme is secure even at most t newly joined users and revoked users collude to recover the session keys that they do not authorized to access. Up to now, the scheme in [13] has been the only self-healing key distribution scheme without the requirement of secure channel between members and the GM in initialization stage. Scheme of [7, 9, 22] Scheme of [13] In most of the previous schemes, storage and communication overhead increases with the order of a session. Computation overhead for the current session key is fixed in each session while computation overhead for self-healing mechanism increases with the order of session too. Without loss generality, we set j = m/2. In addition, we assume that p is a 64-bit integer. Suppose the maximum number of sessions m = 100 and the number of revoked users vary from 0 to 100. We further use figures to illustrate the performance of the existing schemes. For simplicity, we compare only several representative schemes. They are 'Construction 1' in [13, 26, 29] , and 'Construction 1' in [14] . Figures 3, 4 , and 5 illustrate the increase in tendency in terms of storage, communication and computation overhead for the four self-healing key distribution schemes, respectively. As can 
t (the number of revoked users) The size of broadcast (KB)
Scheme of [9] C1 of [7] Scheme of [13] C1 of [22] be seen from the figures, the scheme in [13] has lowest storage overhead, while the Construction 2 in [14] is the best scheme in terms of communication and computation overhead.
Vector space secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes
Sáez [16] considered applying vector space secret-sharing instead of polynomial secret-sharing schemes to realize selfhealing key distribution scheme. The scheme makes use of general monotone decreasing structures for the family of subsets of users that can be revoked instead of a threshold one. Thus the scheme achieves more flexible performance than polynomial secret-sharing-based schemes. Another advantage of the scheme is that the distance between the broadcasts used to recover the lost one is variable. The reason for this modification is to allow adjusting the length of broadcasts according to the condition of networks. In the same year, Sáez [17] considered the possibility that a coalition of users sponsors a user outside the group for one session. First, the formal definition and some bounds on the required amount of information were given. Then a general construction of a family of self-healing key distribution schemes with sponsorization was presented. The sponsorization mechanism strengthens the robustness of the scheme. An authorized subset of users in the group has the ability to invite a new user to join the group without the help of the GM. Both [16] and [17] are unconditionally secure schemes. The model in [17] not only includes Definitions 1 and 2 but also includes Definition 3.
Definition 3. The scheme has the property of sponsorization. This means that the three following properties are satisfied:
(i) Every user U l ∈ G j can generate a proof of sponsorization P j li to sponsor a user U i ∈ G j for session j using his personal key. In other words: 
In Definition 3, Condition (i) describes the property of sponsorization: the information used to sponsor is computed from the personal key. Condition (ii) describes the fact that the information obtained from enough sponsorizations with the correspondent broadcast allows to compute the personal key of the session. Condition (iii) describes the security requirement: a coalition of users outside G j sponsored by not enough users cannot obtain any information about the value of the key K j . The key remains secure even if every user receives sponsorization of a coalitions in S.
The self-healing key distribution scheme with sponsorization includes six procedures. The process was described in Fig. 2 of [34] .
(i) Setup: The GM randomly chooses t × t matrices P 1 , . . . , P m and session keys
For each session j = 1, . . . , m, the group manager computes the vector
tm . The use of specific function ψ fixes the properties of the scheme. 
The second part of the broadcast is defined as follows: 
. . , ψ(i) P m ) ∈ GF (q) t (m−j +1)
and send it to each user U i ∈ J j as its personal key through the secure channel between them. If the GM want to revoke users R j ⊂ G j −1 in session j , what the GM should do is adding the identifiers of users in R j to W j and constructing a new broadcast message. The revoked users cannot decode the broadcast message B j . (vi) Sponsored addition of users: If a user U l ∈ G j wants to sponsor a user U i ∈ G j for session j , then it computes (l, ψ(l) P j ψ(i)) from its personal key (l, ψ(l) P j ) and privately sends it to U i . Then the sponsored user can compute the current session key. See [17] for detail of key computation by the sponsored user.
In fact, polynomial secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribution scheme is a particular case of vector space secretsharing-based scheme. In the class of polynomial secretsharing-based schemes, the access structure is fixed to the degree of the underlying polynomial. Therefore, vector space secret-sharing-based schemes achieve more flexible properties.
The schemes [16, 17] use the same vector space secret-sharing mechanism. The storage, communication and computation overheads are much similar. In terms of storage overhead, each user has to store a personal key of size (m − j + 1) log p in [16] and [17] . The storage overhead is optimal with respect to Theorem 1 in [16] . The communication overhead comes from the broadcast which depends on the particular function ψ used. According to [16] , the broadcast can be divided into two parts. The first part of broadcast is defined as (x j , y j ) . The total number of broadcast bits is (1 + (t + 1)(m − 1 − t/2)) log p. According to [17] , B 1 1 and B 1 m have 1/2tm log p bits and B 1 j for j = 1, m has 1/2t (m − 1) log p bits. Then the total number of broadcast bits is 1/2t (m 2 − m + 2) log p. The second part of broadcast in both [16] and [17] is composed of the identities of revoked users and its purpose is to perform the rejection capability as well as the recovery of the session key. Its length depends on the history of rejected subsets. Since the user identities can be chosen from a small finite field, we can ignore the communication overhead for the broadcast of all those revoked sets. The computation overhead of [16] and [17] Table 3 to highlight the features of the two schemes. The schemes [18] [19] [20] are hash chain-based self-healing key distribution schemes with vector space secretsharing-based masking mechanism. The performance of them will be compared in Table 4 .
SDR-based self-healing key distribution schemes
SDR [35] is a stateless rekeying method. In this protocol, a key server maintains a logical key tree and every user is mapped to a leaf node of the key tree. In each rekeying operation, the key server partitions the current group into a minimal number of subsets, and then encrypts the new group key with the common key of each subset, respectively. In this scheme, the communication overhead is independent of the group size, thus the scheme is scalable. One of the advantage of the scheme is that there is no dependency between the keys used in different rekeying operations. In order to decode the current group key, a user only needs to receive the keys that are transmitted by the key server during the current rekey operation. This property makes the SDR scheme very attractive for secure multicast applications where users may go offline frequently or experience burst packet losses.
The SDR method has good performance in key recovery operation and is secure against the collusion of any number of revoked users. In contrast, polynomial-based key distribution [27] has the similar message size and has the feature that group users can recover group on its own under some conditions. However, this protocol has a constraint which may limit its application. That is, the maximum number of users that can be revoked during the life-long time of networks has to be pre-determined and must not be exceeded for the sake of security. The maximum number of users that can be revoked is depend on the degree of the polynomial. The higher the degree of the polynomial is, the larger the number of the users that can be revoked, and the larger the communication and computation overhead is and vice versa. Zhu et al. first addressed adding self-healing feature to SDR in [22] . The key idea is to bind the ability of a user to recover a lost group key to its membership duration. They used a oneway hash key chain such that revoked users and new users cannot collude to recover the keys that they should not know. The notions are different from those used in the general selfhealing key distribution schemes. The scheme can be displayed as follows:
(i) In each group rekeying, the GM generates a key chain of size m + 1. Let the keys in the key chain generated for the rekeying at 
(i). K 0 (i) is the group key that all the users should use for data encryption between T (i) and T (i + 1).
(ii) The users in the group are considered to be partitioned into m + 1 subgroups, depending upon their membership duration, each subgroup is associated with a separate key from the one-way key chain generated in the first step. Specifically, K j (i) is the key intended for the users that joined the group at T (i − j) for 0 ≤ j < m, and
K m (i) is the key intended for users that joined at or before T (i − m).
(iii) The GM broadcasts m encrypted keys as shown below:
The communication overhead of this protocol is very small. To allow an authorized user to recover the previous s group keys, the number of additional encryption keys to be transmitted is at most 3s.
Bohio et al. [23] considered incorporating the self-healing feature to SDR rekeying method too. Some optimization techniques that can be used to reduce the overhead caused by the self-healing capability are proposed in the paper. In addition, the idea of mutual-healing was discussed. One motivation behind mutual-healing is that, if a node has missed a key updating message, it does not have to wait until the next update broadcast to recover the previous session key, instead it can acquire assistance from its neighboring nodes to recover that key instantly. The procedures of self-healing and mutual-healing are displayed in Fig. 6 .
However, the SDR scheme itself has a limitation. The positions of the revoked users in the tree cannot be reused. This deficiency discounts the feasibility of SDR-based self-healing key distribution schemes accordingly.
Hash chain-based self-healing key distribution schemes
Jiang et al. [21] proposed an efficient self-healing group key scheme with time-limited node revocation based on dual directional hash chains (DDHCs). The performance of the proposed scheme under poor broadcast channel was evaluated by both theoretical analysis and numerical results. The result shows that the scheme tolerates high channel loss rate, and hence makes a good balance between performance and security. Therefore, it is suitable for wireless networks. . The basic procedures in a self-healing and mutual-healing key distribution scheme, where the small panes are operation which must be executed in each round, the small dashed frame represents the operations which may not be executed in some round of the scheme.
As aforementioned, the schemes [14, 18] are based on hash chain. The difference is that [14] utilizes polynomial secretsharing masking mechanism, thus the maximum number of the revoked users is constrained by the degree of polynomial while [18] adopts general access structure thus achieves flexible property. The proposed self-healing technique enables better performance over previous approaches in terms of storage, communication and computation complexity. They provided proof of the security of the proposed scheme under an appropriate security framework. The proof shows that the scheme is computationally secure and achieves both forward and backward secrecy. Kausar et al. [36] proposed a simpler self-healing key distribution scheme. In their scheme, all broadcast messages are masked with XOR operation. The scheme is efficient in terms of storage and computation overhead. However, the operation of dealing with compromised node are too cockamamie to afford. If one compromised node is detected, all nodes are forced to be re-initialized.
Due to the efficiency of hash function, these schemes reduce both communication and computation overheads greatly. At the same time, forward and backward secrecy were achieved. However, there is a fatal defect in these constructions. The collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users will recover all the session keys which they are not entitled to. Tian et al. in [19] dealt with the problem gracefully. They assigned each user U i a pre-arranged life cycle (s i , t i ). Random numbers which is related to the users' membership are used in the procedure of Key recovery. Compared with the scheme in [18] , the scheme in [19] not only keeps forward and backward secrecy but also resists collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users. As far as we know, this is the first time to defend collusion attack against hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes. The schemes in [15, 20] slightly reduced storage and computation overheads of the scheme [19] with polynomial secret-sharing masking mechanism and vector space secret-sharing masking mechanism, respectively. In our recent research, we found that the schemes [15, 19, 20] can only resist collusion between the users whose life cycles have finished and newly joined users. They in fact could not resist collusion attacks of newly joined users and revoked users whose life cycles have not yet expired. How to resist collusion of newly joined users and revoked users whose life cycles have not yet expired is an unsolved problem.
Similarly, the self-healing key distribution scheme [19] is composed of five procedures. 
The session key of the j th session is computed as:
The GM randomly chooses vectors P 1 , . . . , P m ∈ GF (q) l . For each session j = 1, . . . , m, the GM precomputes the scalar z j = K B m−j +1 + ψ(D) P j ∈ GF (q). Each user U i is first assigned a prearranged life cycle (s, t) where 1 ≤ s < t ≤ m, thus U i will be involved in k = t − s + 1 number sessions. The GM privately send personal key S i to U i . It is in the following form:
. . . , r t (ψ(i) P s , . . . , ψ(i) P t ))
It is composed of a forward key K 
(iii) Key recovery: When an authorized user U i received the key distribution message B j for session j , since U i ∈ G j has {(k, ψ(k) P j )} k∈W j and its personal key, it computes
At last, U i computes the j th forward key K
and evaluates the current session key When the GM wants to revoke a user from the communication group, the GM adds the revoked user to the non-authorized subset of users such that R 1 ∪ . . . ∪ R j ⊂ W j and with minimum cardinality. Then the GM constructs the broadcast message based on W j . Only authorized users can recover session keys from the broadcast message due to the special construction of the broadcast message.
The broadcast B j = B 
The hash chain itself cannot be the only cryptographic primitive of a self-healing key distribution scheme. It forms a self-healing key distribution scheme together with other cryptographic primitives. For example, the scheme [21] is base on hash function and MAC, the scheme [36] is base on hash function and XOR operation, the scheme in [14, 15] is based on hash function and polynomial secret sharing, while the schemes in [18] [19] [20] are based on hash chain and vector space secret sharing. These schemes share some commonness and each has its special features as well. We summarize the features of one-way hash function-based self-healing key distribution schemes in Table 4 without [21] . In fact, the scheme in [21] is a totally different self-healing group key distribution mechanism. It supposes that there is a buffer at each sensor in order to recover the lost session keys. Each user has to send the Request Key message to explicitly request the current rekeying message for the current session. That is, this selfhealing mechanism involves interaction between the user and the GM. The communication overhead varies at different user end and it depends on how many rekeying messages the user fails to receives and how large the renewal interval t is. Because each message is encrypted with a Traffic Encryption key (TEK), the computation overhead varies according to the encryption mechanism. The authors did not suggest which encryption mechanism is suitable for the scheme. Therefore, we exclude the scheme [21] from the Table 4 . In Table 4 , the storage overhead of a user U i is the size of its personal key which is closely related to its life cycle (s i , t i ). The communication overhead comes from the broadcast messages for Key recovery and Selfhealing. The communication overhead at the j th session in [18] [19] [20] is (t j + 1) log p bits, where t j = |W j ∪ R j |, R j ∈ is the set of all revoked users for sessions in and before j and W j ⊂ U\G j with minimum cardinality such that W j ∪ R j ∈ 0 . The computation overhead is measured by the number of multiplication in the underlying field. In terms of computation overhead of the scheme in [36] , it only includes hash and XOR operations, so the computation overhead at user end in [36] is a constant compared with that of other schemes such as [18] and [19] . The computation overhead of Key recovery in [18] [19] [20] is 2(t 2 j + t j ). This is the number of multiplication operations needed to recover ψ(D) by using equation ψ(D) = k∈W j ∪{i} λ k ψ(k) [18] . This is because self-healing mechanism involves only hash and addition operations. Compared with the computation overhead brought by multiplication operations, the computation overhead brought by hash and addition operations can be neglected.
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Bilinear pairing-based self-healing key distribution schemes
Although a formal definition of ID-based cryptosystems have been known for a while [37] , the first fully functional fitting all the requirements ID-based cryptosystem appeared only quite recently in [38] . Inspired by the idea of [38] , Du et al. proposed a broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution in [39] . We extended the broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution to a self-healing key distribution scheme in [24] and further proposed formal definition and security model in [40] . The whole process is displayed as follows:
(i) Setup: It is supposed that the GM obtains both public system parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, P , P pub , H 1 , H 2 } and its private key s and all the public key of possible users from an ID-based public key infrastructure (PKI). The GM makes params public and keeps s secret. In params, where G 1 is a cyclic additive group and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group and both of them of the same large prime order q; P ∈ G 1 and s ∈ Z * q and P pub = sP ; H 1 and H 2 are two cryptographic hash functions: 
Let a i represents the transpose of a i . The group manager also constructers |G j | − 1 auxiliary keys
The broadcast message is then formed by computing, for a random r j ∈ Z * q ,
The j -th broadcast is in the following form:
(iii) Key recovery: When a user U i ∈ G j receives the broadcast message B j , it sets a vector a 1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with |G j | elements, and only the ith element is 1. A j is a |G j | × |G j | matrix which is defined as follows:
U i can solve the following system of equations using Cramer's rule or other algebraic methods. (1, 1, . . . , 1) .
. . .
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, user U i needs to compute e(P pub , r j Q Y 1 ), which with knowledge the private key S i it can do via:
= e(r j P , x 1 sQ i ) · e(P pub , x 2 r j Q Y 2 + . . .
Then, U i can recover the session key
(iv) Self-healing: Without loss of generality, suppose U i misses the broadcast message for a session t < j. As far as it belongs to the session group G t , it picks up the polynomial z t from broadcast message B j and forms the |G t | × |G t | matrix A t as operations in the procedure of Key recovery. Then, U i solves the following system of equations. 
= e(r t P , x 1 sQ i ) · e(P pub , x 2 r t Q Y 2 + . . .
Finally, U i recovers the lost session key
If more than one broadcast message get lost, the operation of key recovery is the same as aforementioned. The adding and revoking operations are very efficient in our scheme. For the condition that more than one user join or revoke, the operations preform as aforementioned.
This scheme achieves some good properties. In terms of storage overhead, each user stores only the GM's public key and its public/private key pair. The GM's public key P pub = sP which is a point on G 1 and the order of G 1 is q. The length of the GM's public key is 2 log q. Because H 1 is a mapping from {0, 1}
* to G 1 , so the length of the personal public key
The private key is the multiplication of the master key s ∈ Z * q and the public key, so the size of private keys is 2 log q. Therefore, the storage overhead for each group user is 6 log q. Therefore, the storage overhead for each user is a constant.
The communication overhead comes from the broadcast message B j = {z 1 , . . . , z j }. z j is composed of X i (1 ≤ i ≤ |G j |) and Y j . The size of X i (1 ≤ i ≤ |G j |) is 2 log q and the size of Y j is log q bits. Therefore, the length of z j equals to (2|G j | + 1) log q, which increases in direct proportion to |G j |. Consequently, the size of broadcast message B j is j l=1 (2|G l | + 1) log q bits, which is related to the total number of users j i=1 |G i | in all the communication groups for different sessions and increases in direct proportion to session number j . Therefore, this scheme is only suitable for small-scale networks.
All the computation in the procedure of Key recovery is as follows: (1) Solving a set of linear equations with |G j | variables; (2) |G j | + 1 scalar multiplications in the group G 1 ; (3) |G j | additions in the group G 1 ; (4) Two pairings computation; (5) One hash computation; (6) One XOR operation. Generally speaking, bilinear pairing computation is more time-consuming than scalar multiplication, let alone addition, hash and XOR operation. Therefore, the main computation overhead comes form (4) . The computation overhead of the users at Key recovery stage is two pairing operations.
This scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of unauthorized users, including the revoked users and the newly joined users. In our scheme, if a user wants to obtain the session key K i , it should compute e(X 1 , x 1 S i ) in the procedure of Key recovery with personal key S i . Therefore, only the authorized users can recover the session key. In addition, due to the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problem (DLP), any coalition of non-authorized users cannot derive the private keys of authorized users from their public keys. The personal private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed. Most important of all, this paper presented technique to perform mutual-healing between neighboring nodes. As far as we know, it is the first selfhealing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings. it is also the first time to explore technical details of mutual-healing in self-healing key distribution schemes.
THREE CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this section, we discuss three considerations which can be used to strengthen the robustness of the basic self-healing key distribution schemes. The first one is sponsorization, the second one is mutual healing and the last one is authentication on broadcast messages.
Sponsorization
The motivation for sponsorization is to give dynamism to the general scheme, allowing an authorized subset of users in the group to invite a new user for one session without the interference of the GM. This feature has been considered in other distributed protocols such as group key distribution schemes in [41] and [42] . Sáez [17] considered the process that a coalition of users sponsors a user outside the group for one session. For the sake of security, it is required that only a coalition of authorized users in an access structure can perform this action. A secure unicast channel between each sponsor and the sponsored user is necessary in order to fulfill the sponsorization. It is a rigorous requirement which is infeasible for wireless sensor networks. In addition, the operations introduces too much communication and computation overheads. The motivation is good while the realization is troublesome.
Mutual healing
More et al. [11] pointed out that the protocol discussed in [10] suffers from inconsistent robustness. That is, for certain sessions, if broadcast messages get lost, the user cannot recover the session keys, no matter how many other broadcast messages are received. Subsequently, they used a sliding window mechanism to make error recovery consistently robust: after the initial Setup procedure, any lost key can be recovered as long as two sufficiently close broadcast messages-one before it and one after it-are received. Similar technique is discussed in [33] . The minimum size of the window can be dynamically adjusted according to the condition of networks. Both [33] and [11] guarantee that authorized users can recover window size number of session keys as long as they receive broadcast messages. However, how to recover the session key if the last broadcast message gets lost or more than sliding window number of broadcast messages get lost are never addressed clearly. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to make users completely self-healing according to the existing self-healing key distribution mechanism. In view of some concrete applications, such as live and pay-per-view TV, have strict requirement of freshness. They would better lose only a limited number of broadcast messages. Therefore, it is meaningful to explore counterpart measures to deal with the aforementioned issues. The idea of mutual-healing was proposed in [23] by Bohio et al. The so-called mutual healing is, if a user has missed more than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it can apply for assistance from its neighboring nodes. The neighboring users in the same session group cooperate with each other forwarding broadcast messages which the neighboring users miss. By this way, the authorized users can get the missed broadcast messages in a timely and efficient manner. Thus the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes is strengthened. It was claimed in [23] that there are two requirements for mutual healing: the authentication of requesting users and the users' authorization for the requested session keys. On the one hand, in order to avoid attacks on their limited resource, effective authentication of requesting user must be developed to identify misbehaving users. On the other hand, as messages are broadcasted in the form of plain text, anyone can read them. We argue that the second authentication is unnecessary. Instead, the neighboring users need to forward only the broadcasted message which corresponds to the requested session key. If the requesting user is authorized for the session, it would be able to recover the session key. However, even unauthorized users can receive broadcast messages, they cannot recover the session key.
The paper [23] proposed only a general idea without exploring technical details. We targeted the problem with bilinear pairings technique in [24] . The definition and security model for mutual healing key distribution was formalized in [40] . By binding the identity and location of nodes, the authors explored the ways to realize mutual healing. A pairwise key is the byproduct of authentication. The pair-wise key can be used for private communication between two nodes. The authentication process is helpful to identify cooperating or misbehaving nodes. However, the prerequisite of [40] is the awareness of the identity and location of each node. This prerequisite implies that the scheme [40] is suitable for static wireless sensor networks. Although the mutual-healing technique is more useful in mobile network, tt is not trivial to realize mutual healing in mobile environment.
Authentication on broadcast messages
In self-healing key distribution schemes, session keys are masked by some private elements. The broadcast messages for key distribution are transmitted in plain text form. The existing self-healing key distribution schemes focus on the exact construction and improvement of performance. It is supposed that the broadcast channel can keep the integrity of broadcast message. However, in real network environment, the adversaries can launch various attacks, such as substitute a false message for a legitimate one and modify broadcast message, on broadcast message easily. This assumption is not compatible with real application. In order to keep the correctness and availability of a self-healing key distribution scheme, it should be possible for the users in the communication group to verify that the broadcast messages have not been substituted or modified in transit. Attempts to add an integrity checking property to existing protocols often focus on cryptographic authentication mechanisms. Aside from the limited resource that make digital signature schemes impractical, authentication in sensor networks poses serious complications. It is unclear how to establish trust especially in large-scale ad hoc deployments. Adding security often fails even in systems without these additional constraints. Therefore, efficient and effective authentication on the identity of the GM and the integrity of broadcasts are of great importance. Otherwise, the correctness of the recovered session keys cannot be guaranteed. Designing the authentication mechanism for wireless networks is an important research topic at present.
Intuitionally, a symmetric key, TEK, can be used to encrypt broadcast messages by the GM and decrypt broadcast messages by the group users. In dynamic group communication, TEK must be refreshed on each change of membership. Jiang et al. [21] used TEK to prevent non-legitimate nodes from having access to the secret broadcast contents. The TEK is renewed periodically instead of an every node topology change. Han et al. [34] considerate encrypting broadcast messages by TEK, thus the integrity of broadcast messages can be kept.
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Two constructions of TEK were proposed in [34] . The first construction brought too much computation load for the GM. The second construction is only feasible to the self-healing key distribution scheme proposed in [34] . It is meaningful to explore practical ways to construct and renew TEK.
COMPOSITIVE ANALYSIS AND FUTURE WORK
According to the state-of-the-art research, self-healing key distribution is the most suitable way to establish session key for large and dynamic group communication over unreliable wireless networks. It is one of the branch of key management and has received much attention. In this section, first, we make a compositive analysis on existing schemes and then we outline the problems to be solved.
Compositive analysis on exiting schemes
Although unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution schemes can keep strict security requirement, they should meet some lower bounds in terms of storage and communication overheads. Computationally secure self-healing key distribution schemes relax the security slightly and achieve some nice features, such as constant storage overhead. As far as the cryptographic primitives are concerned, self-healing key distribution schemes are limited to polynomial secret sharing, vector space secret sharing, hash chain and SDR mechanism. The authors of this paper tried to design bilinear pairing-based self-healing key distribution scheme and have made a little progress. Figure 7 provides taxonomy of papers on self-healing key distribution schemes. The figure is a directed acyclic graphs where nodes represent papers. Directed edges show predecessor/successor relations among the papers. There is an edge from a paper to another one if the latter provides improvement for the solution proposed by the former. Papers are ordered over a horizontal time axis according to their publication dates. Vertical axis groups papers under five categories: (1) polynomial secret sharing, (2) SDR, (3) vector space secret sharing, (4) hash chain and (5) bilinear pairingbased self-healing key distribution schemes. The style of edge in between two nodes represents the problem in which an improvement is provided. A paper may based on more than one cryptographic primitive; therefore, corresponding may be reachable from more than one origin paper, and there may be more than one edge with different styles in between two papers.
Every category has its features, requirements and goals. In summary, polynomial secret sharing is the most common technique used to realize self-healing key distribution. It performs easily. However, the maximum number of revoked FIGURE 7. Taxonomy of the papers on self-healing key distribution schemes. The graph is a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent papers, and edges represent predecessor/successor relations among solutions provided by the papers. Style of an edge represents the problem on which destination paper provides improvements.
users is constraint to the degree of the polynomial. In addition, in the procedure of Key recovery, Lagrange's interpolation formula should be used in order to recover the secret polynomial, thus leading to much computation overhead.
Vector space secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes consider a monotone-decreasing family of rejected subset of users instead of a monotone decreasing threshold structure. This general case makes the self-healing scheme more flexible and suitable for practical application. In addition, the constructions are general in the sense that they depend on the particular public mappings and for different choices of public mappings different self-healing key distribution schemes can be attained. The length of broadcast messages also depends on the particular function.
Hash chain has many elegant features and can be used to design self-healing key distribution schemes. The constructions do not need to send the recorders of revoked subsets of users in order to perform self-healing, yielding reduction in the communication cost. Both forward and backward secrecy and partial collusion resistance property can be assured. However, the collusion of the revoked nodes whose life cycles do not expire and the newly joined nodes can recover the session keys that they are not authorized to.
One of the remarkable properties of SDR-based selfhealing key distributions is that the personal keys of users are independent of the number of sessions. Because of this property, the SDR-based schemes do not require a redistribution of any personal keys after the number of sessions exceeds the estimation. Another remarkable property of SDR schemes is that they can revoke any number of users and remain secure against their collusion. As in the original SDR algorithm, the number of subsets increases when users join and leave. The communication complexity depends upon how many additional subsets Na introduces. The value of Na depends on the group size, the number of the newly joined users and the revoked users in each rekeying period and the value of session number m.
Tian et al. presented a self-healing key distribution scheme by using bilinear pairings. The scheme achieved several nice features as aforementioned. However, the communication overhead increases with the number of authorized users in the communication group. How to reduce the communication overhead is an interesting problem to be solved. Table 5 summarizes the advantage and disadvantage of each class of self-healing key distribution schemes.
Future work
Further research effort should be made to meet the lower bounds on communication overhead in unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution scheme without increasing too much storage and computation overheads. Finding efficient constructions which exhibit a good tradeoff between user memory storage and broadcast size is also an interesting open problem. The hash condition featured with limited onboard computing resource and unsupervised environment for wireless nodes makes them volunerable to attacks. The limited ability of individual nodes to thwart failure or attack makes ensuring network availability more difficult [43] . Sponsorization and mutual healing can be seen as countermeasures against fault and intrusion. The communication and computation overheads of sponsorization are too high to afford for nodes in wireless sensor networks. Mutual healing, that is, if a user has missed more than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it can get assistance from its neighboring nodes. It seems that mutual healing is a practical way. However, many exisiting schemes are not practical technique to realize the idea since it was proposed in [23] by Bohio et al. By combining the identity and location of nodes, we explored the means to realize it. It should be noted that locating node is a resourceconsuming work. It is interesting to explore practical way of mutual healing.
It is supposed that there is only one GM in general self-healing key distribution schemes. These schemes can easily be extended to a multi-GM self-healing key distribution schemes. Each GM can dynamically broadcast messages into an arbitrary group of receiver determined by it. This extension raises the issue of data source or broadcaster authentication. We may acquire 568 B. Tian et al. some ideas from authenticated broadcast encryption scheme such as [44] .
In the pioneering work [10] , the possibility of long-lived personal key scheme was discussed. The reusage of personal key was also discussed in [11] and [13] . However, it seems that none of them is feasible. In order to keep security, new personal keys are periodically distributed to groups users through either by unicast or by off-line means. Both are inefficient for a large communication group. It would be interesting to consider other personal key distribution methods. Specifically, we would like to be able to periodically distribute new personal keys via broadcast, so that after a user is added to the group, no further secure unicast channel between it and the GM is necessary.
Finally, new techniques to implement self-healing key distribution, apart from those we have just described, represent another interesting target for researchers, due to the suitability of this approach to key distribution. In addition, when the resource of nodes in wireless networks is not limited, the asymmetric keys-based self-healing key distribution will be a promising research direction.
CONCLUSION
With the wide application of wireless networks, as one of the basic security service, self-healing key distribution scheme will receive more attention. In this paper, we reviewed most existing self-healing key distribution schemes. We clarified the security requirements of self-healing key distribution schemes according to their special application environment. Then we classified the schemes according to different cryptographic primitives and give an insight to their features and goals. We made a thorough comparison on performance and delineated their similarities and differences through tables and figures. We have also discussed sponsorization, mutual healing and authentication techniques which can be used to strengthen the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes. We pointed out several open research problems in self-healing key distribution schemes and suggested the future research topics in this field. Our analysis made it clear that there is no unique solution that satisfies all requirements. The optimal combination of bandwidth efficiency and robustness against link loss under a given power consumption should be sought in future. Also, secure and efficient key revocation remains an challenge for bilinear pairing based self-healing key distribution schemes.
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